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ABSTRACT KEYWORDS 
According to the evolution tendency of the control decision process from a trackside to a 
train-borne system, various autonomous localization units for railway vehicles were devel-
oped. As recommended in railway standards, the design process of each system, here the 
autonomous localization units (LU), follows the V-model whose first step is to define its 
availability requirement in order to satisfy the global ETCS system requirements. The clas-
sical approach for assigning the subsystem availability is based on the assumption that fail-
ure parameters of other units are precisely known. This assumption is too restricted in 
reality due to the lack of information. In this paper, we propose a new approach that allows 
taking into account uncertainties in the dependability parameters of the ETCS components 
for identifying the upper threshold of the LU unavailability to reach ETCS availability require-
ments. Using fuzzy fault trees, the fuzzy unavailability of the ETCS without the autonomous 
LU is evaluated. Then, based on its membership function, we assess the satisfaction rate 
that an advanced ETCS with the autonomous LU can satisfy the ETCS availability target. 
Fuzzy sets; high speed rail; 
intelligent control system; 
system availability 
Introduction 
The European Train Control System (ETCS) is 
designed to supervise train traffic and to ensure that a 
train does not travel further than a permitted place 
and does not exceed an allowed speed. For ETCS level 
1 and level 2, the train integrity and the train localiza-
tion or detection generally relies on trackside compo-
nents such as: balises, track circuit or axle counters 
(Flammini, 2006). However, these methods lead to 
high maintenance costs and expensive investment 
costs for infrastructure deployment. In recent years, 
the evolution of the control process from a trackside 
to a train-borne system is a promising solution to 
solve this issue. Thus with the localization entirely 
performed onboard, no trackside infrastructure instal-
lation are required, and the onboard system's main-
tenance can be easily done during the frequent checks 
of the train, the maintenance and infrastructure costs 
can be reduced. In addition, such autonomous local-
ization unit (LU) makes the train more intelligent. 
Indeed, as the localization can be more accurate and 
continuous, it can serve to perform several functions 
timely and autonomously, such as door opens, 
lighting and speed limit controls, etc. In particular, 
what is the most beneficial with the improvement of 
the localization properties by an embedded equipment 
is the possibility to augment traffic capacity. The rea-
son is that train movements will be no more con-
strained by trackside fixed installations that, currently, 
separate trains with long safety buffer. Thus, the 
autonomous LU becomes an important key for train 
fluidity and network rentability, especially for second-
ary networks. Therefore, to obtain an advanced ETCS, 
no more track circuits or axle counters will be neces-
sary for the localization of the trains (Liefferinge & 
Paties, 2015) and the autonomous LU becomes an 
important key. Benefiting from the advantage of 
worldwide coverage of the Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS), numerous research projects aimed at 
employing satellite-based autonomous localization 
into ETCS [GRAIL-2 (Marradi et al., 2012), 
EATS (Arrizabalaga et al., 2014), GaLoROI (Manz 
et al., 2015) ]. 
The development process of new devices and 
especially the autonomous LU dedicated to safety 
operations requires the dependability parameters to be 
evaluated according to the European railway 
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standards: EN 50126-1,2, EN 50128, and EN 50129.
These activities strive to assure the quality of the ser-
vice delivered by the equipment. In fact, it is neces-
sary to ensure that the autonomous LU availability
permit to attain the desired overall ETCS availability.
The two general methods that are widely used for this
process are the “bottom-up” evaluation and the
“top-down” apportionment approaches. For the
“bottom-up” approach, the expected reliability and
maintainability data of individual components are
used to predict the overall system availability
(Nguyen, Beugin, & Marais, 2013; Nguyen, Beugin, &
Marais, 2015). This predicted value is compared to
the requirement, and then the system design is
adjusted if necessary to reach the goal. One of the
principal drawbacks of this approach is the need for
detailed information on the system, component data,
and dynamic behaviors. This information is acquired
with difficulty and often unknown in the development
phase of a new system. These aspects are rather meas-
ured in the test phase. Therefore, in the development
phase, the apportionment approach, which is a pro-
cess where dependability requirements of a system are
divided among the various subsystems, is preferred.
However, for a large complex system when mutual
effects between component operations exist, the avail-
ability goal cannot be decomposed straightforwardly
from the overall system to subsystems (Qiu, Sallak,
Sch€on, & Cherfi-Boulanger, 2014). Therefore, a hybrid
approach that combines “bottom-up” and “top-down”
evaluations is proposed in this paper. Furthermore,
for handling the lack of information about component
dependability parameters, we propose to use fuzzy
numbers to characterize the parametric uncertainties.
This article is structured as follows: Firstly, we
describe the ETCS operational principles and the evo-
lution of the ETCS to an advanced-ETCS. Secondly,
we propose a new hybrid approach to evaluate the
unavailability requirement of a new autonomous LU
and explains how to handle the parametric uncertain-
ties. Next, the procedure to assess the fault tree top
event using fuzzy parameters is presented. Then, the
satisfaction curve of the LU unavailable values is pre-
sented. Finally, conclusions and prospects of the
future works are discussed.
Evolution of the ETCS to an advanced ETCS
Nowadays, the adoption of the European Management
System (ERTMS) is necessary to facilitate the rail traf-
fic in European network. This European standard pro-
gram allows to developing a common interoperable
system for railway stakeholders to be developed. It
can be installed on conventional or high-speed lines
with several possibilities of implementation. The third
level of implementation of ERTMS is still at a concep-
tual stage and relies on the evolution of the ETCS
sub-parts with the tendency to remove all the
trackside equipment to implement their functional-
ities onboard.
Operational principles of the ETCS level 3
For the ETCS Level 3, the trains operate based on the
“moving block” principle. In detail, the onboard
equipment (OBU) determines the location of the
entire train and transmits the train information to the
radio block center (RBC) through the data communi-
cation system (DCS).
In this context, the RBC principal mission does not
significantly change compared to the one in its first
deployment in ETCS L2. The RBC receives informa-
tion from the trains, monitors the railway area status
that it controls and, based on this information, gener-
ates movement authority (MA) with route and speed
restrictions data contained in its Computer Processing
Unit (CPU).
Based on the received MA, the onboard unit deter-
mines the End of Authority (EOA) with velocity curve
and presents them on the Driver Machine Interface
(DMI). Considering the EOA and speed curve infor-
mation, the onboard equipment will trigger the brakes
when necessary, for example, when train exceeds
the EOA.
The communication between the trains and the
RBC are performed through a wireless data communi-
cation system (DCS). According to the ETCS develop-
ment process, the wireless DCS role becomes more
and more important as it offers continuous communi-
cations and therefore can improve train operations
(Bo Ai et al., 2014). For details, the evolution of the
ETCS and the DCS subsystems in interaction with the
ETCS will be well considered in the next subsection.
Evolutions of the ETCS
The evolution of the ETCS is presented through the
development process from the level 0 when the track-
side equipment is non-ETCS compliant to the level 3
with a gradual migration of the trackside equipment
toward an autonomous train-born system. For ETCS
L3, the location for the train traffic control depends
on the designed architecture will be provided by
onboard equipment, and therefore trackside train
localization is optional (Ramdas & Bradbury, 2010):
 Hybrid architecture: The train localization is per-
formed by both the onboard equipment or track
circuits and axle counters. The local control and
signaling functions provided by track circuits and
axle counters may be considered as a redundant
function of the RBC. This architecture can deliver
increased operational performances but it enhances
the complexity of the system and also the infra-
structure and maintenance cost.
 Simple architecture: It eliminates all balises and
depends totally on onboard based train localiza-
tion. The infrastructure equipment consists only of
a combined RBC with control and signaling func-
tions. Therefore, the reliability of the onboard LU
becomes significant and the RBC must takes into
account various uncertainties involved. However,
the advantage is to reduce the investment costs for
infrastructure deployment and also the operation,
maintenance cost.
The train integrity function, that is, the function
that verifies that the train did not lose any wagen,
could be also realized onboard in ETCS L3 using the
localization function when it provides the head and
the tail position of the train.
New technologies of DCS subsystems and autono-
mous LUs are envisaged in order to assure robustness
and continuous services for the simple architecture of
ETCS Level 3.
Long term evolution (LTE) technology
for the wireless DCS
The ETCS L2 actually relies on continuous exchanges
via GSM-R networks. However, (Sniady, 2015) showed
the limitation of GSM-R, which cannot meet the user
requirements when the accessibility, and the product-
ivity of transport system increase. In detail, due to
lacking comprehensible QoS features (such as end-to-
end resource management), its potential to support a
multi-service delivery network in critical environments
is limited. Another problem with GSM-R is its insuffi-
cient capacity. In central stations, providing a suffi-
cient number of channels to serve all the trains is a
major problem, especially when new passenger serv-
ices (such as multimedia entertainment applications
for passengers) are deployed. In addition, the long
handover procedure also limits the possibility of
implementation of the ETCS for high-speed trains.
(Sniady et al., 2013) highlighted the benefits when
deploying the LTE network for ETCS.
Because of the ability to support multi-service traf-
fic (voice, video, data) that demands resilience or high
bandwidth real-time capabilities, LTE offers an
immense perspective to railway industry. In fact, with
a low user plane latency, LTE leads to higher effi-
ciency in train operation system. Through fast hand-
over and global roaming procedure, it also meets the
mobility requirements of high-speed train systems
with targets up to 350 km/h. Moreover, QoS manage-
ment mechanism built into LTE allows us to guaran-
tee delivery of critical communication traffic over
multi-service networks. With these features, (Ai et al.,
2014) showed the tendency that all the railway serv-
ices could be then gradually transferred to the LTE-R
system according to the gradual maturity of LTE-R.
The communication errors and the dependability
parameters of such LTE-based DCS are analyzed in
Nguyen, Beugin, Berbineau, and Kassab (2014,
Nguyen, Beugin, Berbineau, & Kassab, 2015).
GNSS technology for the autonomous
localization unit
The development of multi-constellations satellite such
as the Russian GLONASS, the European Galileo, and
the Chinese Compass offers an interoperable world-
wide solution for navigation. In order to enhance the
GNSS signal availability (Roongpiboonsopit & Karimi,
2009) presents a multi-constellations satellite selection
algorithm (MCSSA) that allows a GNSS receiver to be
able to couple satellites from all available constella-
tions for positioning a user in the required time inter-
vals. The issue is to analyze if the performances of
GNSS systems satisfy the railway requirements, in par-
ticular for safety-related applications. In (Filip, Bazant,
Mocek, & Cach, 2000), authors examined the per-
formance of a standalone GPS/GLONASS satellite
navigation system and also its combination with iner-
tial navigation systems (INS) for safety-related appli-
cations in the railway industry. (Nguyen et al., 2013;
Nguyen et al., 2015) evaluated the dependability of a
GNSS & Eddy Current Sensors (ECS) based LU. In
fact, numerous research projects such as GRAIL-2
(Marradi et al., 2012), EATS (Arrizabalaga et al.,
2014), GaLoROI (Manz et al., 2015), had been
launched and therefore highlighted the trend to
employ the autonomous localization into ETCS. In
this context, our work focuses on the ETCS with an
autonomous LU and aims to identify the availability
requirements for this autonomous LU.
Advanced ETCS architecture
According to the current development tendency of the
ERTMS/ETCS, an advanced ETCS is considered in
this article. It supervises, controls train speed against
an allowed speed profile (braking curve) which is
automatically elaborated by the onboard equipment.
No more track circuits or axle counters will be
installed for the detection of the trains. The LTE tech-
nology and the autonomous LU are respectively rec-
ommended for the data communication system
between trains and the RBC and for train localization.
The simple architecture of an advanced ETCS is then
presented in Figure 1.
New approach to identifying the unavailability
requirement of a new autonomous LU
For determining the unavailability requirement of the
LU, two general approaches can be adopted: the “top-
down” apportionment approach or the “bottom-up”
evaluation approach. However, when analyzing a par-
ticular sub-part in a more global and complex system
(the ETCS), these two methods present issues that are
presented in the following subsections. Therefore, we
propose a procedure that allows to combine two
above approaches and also to handle uncertain
dependability parameters.
Issue of the “top-down” apportionment approach
for Sub-systems, parts of a complex system
When considering a large complex system of system
(SoS), the unexpected properties in the collective
behavior of entities within their environment should
be carefully considered. For example, the ETCS avail-
ability may become lower because of interactions of
subsystems. Thus, the overall availability cannot be
directly deduced by the sum of subsystems availability
(Qiu et al., 2014). The overall availability should be
evaluated at the SoS level in a determined context. In
fact, EEIG ERTMS Users Group (1998) defined avail-
ability targets for ETCS according to different limited
views of the system. Therefore, the availability appor-
tionment cannot be decomposed straightforwardly
from the overall system to subsystems, especially to
the onboard LU on which focuses this article. It is
necessary to identify the availability requirements of
an autonomous LU from the SoS level.
Issue of the “bottom-up” approach for evaluating
the ETCS dependability given parametric
uncertainties
In the literature, numerous studies used “bottom-up”
approach to assessing the reliability parameters of the
Figure 1. Simple architecture of the advanced ETCS in ERTMS L3. TIU: Train Interface Unit, RTM: Radio Transmission Module, DMI:
Driver Machine Interface, LU: localization Unit, WAN: Wide Area Network, TMR: Triple Modular redundant architecture of calculation
units (Flammini,2006).
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ETCS. In Flammini (2006), the author described sev-
eral fault trees of different subsystems of ERTMS/
ETCS L2 and based on them, evaluated the ETCS
availability. Vernez and Vuille (2009) proposed to use
the functional failure mode, effects and criticality ana-
lysis (FMECA) approach to address the dependability
optimization of the ETCS L2. Yasuoka, Watabe,
Hattori, and Matsumoto (2011) analyzed data of mal-
functions of signaling operations within the Japanese
railway east service area to evaluate the system reli-
ability. Min, Chunhui, and Sen (2013) used Stochastic
Reward Net for modeling the function and equipment
structure of rail signaling system, and then based on
it, evaluated its reliability. Morant, Larsson-Kråik, and
Kumar (2016) analyzed the empirical data recorded
on the corrective maintenance work orders of the
Swedish railway signaling system for constructing a
data-driven decision support model to study its main-
tenance performance. Qiu et al. (2014) proposed to
use the statechart to evaluate the unavailability of the
whole ERTMS L2.
In reality, it is difficult to estimate a precise value of
failure, repair rates or unavailable probabilities of com-
ponents due to lack of data. It is better to consider
uncertainties associated with the dependability parame-
ters to reflect the state of knowledge. Using Monte
Carlo simulation (Qiu, Sallak, Sch€on, & Cherfi-
Boulanger, 2013) examined the parametric uncertainty
present in transition rates of a railway signaling system.
However, the long simulation time is an issue. Besides,
it requires much information and, moreover, it is not
easy to propose an appropriate probability distribution
for the epistemic parameter uncertainties. Among
numerous uncertainty theories, the fuzzy set theory
provides robust methodology to analyze the reliability
and availability in the case of lacking or of inaccurate
data (e.g. failure or repair rate of components; Kumar
& Kumar, 2011). In fact, the fuzzy theory is recom-
mended as a tool to model reality better than trad-
itional probabilistic approaches because of improved
results of empirical validation (Zimmermann, 2010).
Hybrid approach handling uncertain
dependability parameters
To give an overview of the hybrid approach, its prin-
ciples are first described with each feature chosen into
the methodology and their advantages. The steps of
the approach are then presented and detailed.
The top-down approach permits to identify the
dependability (especially the availability) requirements
of subsystems using an apportionment analysis from
the dependability requirement of the overall system. In
practice, when there are different interactions between
components, such requirement cannot be straightfor-
wardly decomposed. Contrarily, the bottom-up approach
starts with the dependability parameters of components
and then investigates their interactions to deduce the
inference principles for evaluating the overall system
dependability. However, this method requires precise
information on the parameter values of the components,
as well as the structure and behavior of the system. For
new systems, there is no sufficient obtainable informa-
tion. Therefore, we propose to integrate both methods
in a hybrid apportionment procedure to determine the
availability of sub-systems such as the LU in this article.
Moreover, the main advantage of this new method com-
pared to other classical methods is the ability to handle
parameter value uncertainties. It leads to the satisfaction
rate information corresponding to the uncertainty inter-
val of the sub-system unavailability when considering
the overall system dependability requirement. The
approach is based on the following procedure steps
described in next sub-sections.
 First step: preliminary allocation of the unavail-
ability target to an advanced ETCS. We translate
the ETCS availability goals defined by (EEIG
ERTMS Users Group, 1998) into upper thresholds
for the advanced ETCS unavailability caused by
different failure types.
 Second step: analysis of the causes that lead to the
advanced ETCS unavailability. Based on functional
modeling of the overall system, the failure combina-
tions in which the autonomous LU intervenes and
that lead to system unavailability are analyzed. Fuzzy
parameters will be employed to consider uncertain
dependability values linked to the failure causes.
 Third step: identification of the satisfaction curve
of the LU unavailability values to meet the advanced
ETCS unavailability requirement. The autonomous
LU unavailability target that allows the advanced
ETCS unavailability targets to be achieved will be
identified in the form of an uncertain unavailability.
Therefore, the overall satisfaction curve, which
presents the satisfaction rates to the ETCS require-
ments according to every unavailability value of the
autonomous LU, will be deduced.
Preliminary allocation of the unavailability targets
to an advanced ETCS
The causes of downtime during the train control sys-
tem and subsystems operation can be classified into
the following categories:
 Internal system weaknesses,
 Software failure: unavailability generated by
software defects in the deployed version.
 Hardware failure: outages due to degradation
mechanism in the devices.
 External influences,
 Human errors: unavailability related to human
operating errors.
 Airgap failure: unavailability related to the oper-
ational environment, such those due to trans-
mission errors.
 Intentioned attacks: unavailability related to
physical or cyber attacks.
Due to the properties of the ETCS unavailability
that are present in a given view and not present in
any other view (EEIG ERTMS Users Group, 1998)
defined various mean availability targets for the ETCS
relating to every given view. In this article, we are
interested in the following two requirements, in which
the autonomous LU intervenes:
R1: The ERTMS/ETCS quantifiable contribution to
operational availability, due to hardware failures, shall
be not less than 0.999854.
That means the advanced ETCS unavailability due
to hardware failures is inferior to UR1 where
UR1 ¼ 1:46E4. This unavailability target is linked to
the top event of the Fault Tree (FT) presented in
Figure 2. The FT structure will be explained in detail
in next subsection.
R2: The ERTMS/ETCS quantifiable contribution to
operational availability, due to hardware failures and
transmission errors, shall not be less than 0.99984.
The R2 can be translated into the advanced ETCS
unavailability due to hardware failures and transmis-
sion errors. This unavailability is then inferior to UR2,
where UR2 ¼ 1:6E4. This unavailability target is
linked to the top event of the Fault Tree (FT) pre-
sented in Figure 3. The details of this FT will be dis-
cussed in next subsection.
Analysis of the causes that lead to the advanced
ETCS unavailability
This section details the second step of the procedure,
that is, it analyzes the failure combinations in which
the autonomous LU intervenes and that lead to the
advanced ETCS unavailability.
Figure 2 presents the hardware failure causes that
lead to the advanced ETCS unavailability. It includes
the following causes:
 IE1 - when the train “position report” message is
unavailable due to hardware failures of the LU or
of the onboard equipment, see details in Figure 4.
 when the train cannot send the message (IE2)
or receive the message (IE3) due to hardware fail-
ures of transmission components, such as the
eCNS, the eNodeB, and the receiving-transmit-
ting antenna.
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Figure 2. The advanced ETCS unavailability due to hardware failures (LU Hard: Localization Unit Hardware, eCNS: eLTE Core
Network Access System, RBC: Radio Block Center, DMI: Driver Machine Interface, TIU: Train Interface Unit). TE1: Advanced ETCS
unavailability due to Hardware failures, IE1: Unavailable message from train due to Hardware failures, IE2: Unavailable signal from
train to RBC due to Hardware failures, IE3: Unavailable signal from RBC to train due to Hardware failures, IE4: Failed treatment of
the received MA at train.
 when there exist hardware failures in the RBC. The
RBC unavailability is well analyzed in Figure 5.
 when the MA cannot be correctly treated at the
train due to hardware failures of the onboard
equipment, the driver machine interface (DMI), or
the train interface unit (TIU). The DMI (served to
provide onboard interaction with the train driver)
and the TIU (used to make the interface between
TIU and train-borne equipment, e.g. the brakes)
have each of them one redundant unit (Flammini,
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Figure 3. The advanced ETCS unavailability due to hardware failures and communication errors (TE2: Advanced ETCS unavailability
due to hardware failures and communication errors, RBC: Radio Block Center, DCS: Data Communication System).
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Figure 5. The RBC unavailability (RBC: Radio Block Center, PS: Power System, TMR: Triple Modular Redundancy, EuroRTM:
EuroRadio Transmission Module, CPU: Computer Processor Unit, WAN: Wide Area network).
2006). Therefore, the DMI (or TIU) is considered
as unavailable when both units, DMI1 and DMI2
(or TIU1 and TIU2) are failed.
Figure 3 presents the advanced ETCS unavailability
due to hardware failures and communication errors.
Compared with Figure 2, the fault tree in this case
also takes into account the data communication sys-
tem unavailability due to air gap unavailability (DCS
air-gap 1 for the signal from the train to the RBC,
and DCS air-gap 2 for the signal from the RBC to
the train).
The air gap failures are related to connection losses
due to network coverage and service quality of the
communication system. Following the study on the
impact of the radio deployment on ETCS presented in
(Sniady, 2015), the LTE delay performance is signifi-
cantly better than GSM-R, and furthermore, no data
loss was observed. In other words, the negative contri-
bution of the LTE service quality can be negligible
when evaluating the steady state availability of the
DCS. In this article, only connection loss due to net-
work coverage is considered in the DCS air
gap failure.
The onboard equipment fault tree
In the advanced ETCS, the onboard unit structure is
similar to the one presented in Flammini (2006), but
the train localization is only performed by itself.
Therefore, the balise transmission module is removed,
and the odometer is replaced by the autonomous LU
that should to ensure accurate, continuous, and reli-
able localization results.
The onboard fault tree is then presented in Figure
4. Its top event happens when the redundant compo-
nents are failed. These components are the power sys-
tem (PS), or bus (BUS), or CPU, or voter, that is,
component linked to the 2 out of 3 (2oo3) architec-
ture realizing the majority vote strategy. Their redun-
dant configurations are explained in detail in
(Flammini, 2006).
The LU presented in this article is considered as a
black box. We are only interested in its hardware
unavailability.
The radio block Centre fault tree
The RBC structure in the advanced ETCS is similar to
the traditional RBC structure in ERTMS L2. Then, the
RBC fault tree is described in Figure 5 following
(Flammini, 2006). Its top event occurs when one of
the following critical events happens:
 The three PS components connected in parallel
are failed.
 The two redundant buses, for interconnecting sys-
tem peripherals, are failed.
 The Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) architec-
ture of CPU (2oo3 voting logic) is unavailable.
 EuroRTM (EuroRadio Transmission Module) that
helps the RBC is connected to the DCS is failed.
Its interface technology depends on the data com-
munication system technology (e.g., WIFI, GSM-R
or LTE, etc.).
 The redundant configuration of 2 WAN (Wide
Area Network) used to connect the RBC and other
ETCS-trackside components is failed.
The procedure to evaluate the top event of these
FT using fuzzy parameters will be presented in
next section.
Procedure to evaluate the fault tree top event
using fuzzy parameters
In this section, we firstly present the common formulas
used for calculating the unavailability of a system made
of different combined components with constant failure
and repair rates. The fuzzy numbers are used to handle
the uncertainty of these values. Thus, the basic theoret-
ical background on fuzzy numbers and their combin-
ation are reminded. Finally, we explain how to
introduce fuzzy numbers into a fault tree.
Mathematical background
Common unavailability assessment
Consider a component i whose the lifetime and repair
time are exponential with failure rate ki, and repair
rate i, the component unavailability in steady state is
given by (Rausand & Hoyland, 2004):
Ui ¼ ki
i þ ki (1)
In this article, assuming that
 failed components receive repair services right
away no matter how many components are failed,
 working components are normally subjected to
their failures when other components or systems
are down, the output probability of the OR-gate,
AND-gate and K-out-of-N gate of the FT are eval-
uated similarly to the unavailability of systems
----
connected in series, parallels or K-out-of-N struc-
tures, following (Li, Zuo, & Yam, 2006):
 when n components are connected in series having
availability Ai, failure rate ki and repair rate i,
then the system unavailability (or in other words,
the OR-gate output) is given by:
US ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
Ai ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
i
i þ ki (2)
 when the system is composed of n identical compo-
nents in parallel having failure rate k and repair
rate , then the system unavailability (or in other
words, the AND-gate output of identical inputs) is
given by:
US ¼
Yn
i¼1
1 Aið Þ ¼ k
ð Þn
 þ kð Þn (3)
 when the system has a redundant configuration of
K-out-of-N identical components having failure rate
k and repair rate , then the system unavailability
(or in other words, the KooN-gate output of identi-
cal inputs) is given by:
US ¼ k
n
kþ ð Þn
Xk 1
r¼0

k
 r
(4)
Then, the unavailability in the case of a 2oo3 sys-
tem (i.e the 2oo3-gate output) is given by:
US ¼ 3k
2 þ k3
 þ kð Þ3
(5)
Fuzzy number and fuzzy arithmetic
Depending on the available knowledge, the failure or
repair rate of a component can be modeled by a pre-
cise value or by typical values, a distribution, or an
interval. In reality, when only little knowledge is avail-
able, the failure or repair rate’s value can simply be
represented by an interval from a lower bound a to
an upper bound c. Although there may not be suffi-
cient information in between a and c to construct a
whole distribution, often in practice, there is some
preference for a more probable value b 2 ½a; c. This
preference can stem from one or a few past cases, pre-
vious experience, or knowledge of experts. The con-
text calls for the use of a fuzzy number, which is an
imprecise quantity dedicated to taking into account
such inherent uncertainty (Zimmermann, 2010). That
is the reason why in this paper, we extend the repre-
sentation of dependability parameters to fuzzy num-
bers. In detail, we prefer a triangular fuzzy number
over a triangular probabilistic distribution since the
latter requires much richer historical information or
background data to define its shape.
Definition 0.1. Fuzzy number
Let X be a universal set, then a fuzzy number ~X is
a convex normalized fuzzy set ~X , defined by its mem-
bership function: l~X : X ! ½0; 1, called the grade of
membership of x in ~X . This membership function
assigns a real number l~XðxÞ in the interval ½0; 1 to
each element x 2 X.
Definition 0.2. a-cut set
Given a fuzzy set ~X in X and any real number
a 2 ½0; 1, then the a-cut set of ~X , denoted by ~Xa, is
an interval defined by: ~Xa ¼ fx 2 X; l~XðxÞ  ag, see
Figure 6.
Definition 0.3. Fuzzy arithmetic with a-cut sets
Let ½xLa; xRa  and ½yLa; yRa  are respectively the a-cut
interval of ~X and ~Y with the corresponding a value,
then the a-cut interval of ~Z ¼ f ð~X ; ~Y Þ is defined as
½zLa ; zRa  where:
zLa ¼ min x2 xLa ;xRa½ ;y2 yLa ;yRa½ 
 f x; yð Þ
zRa ¼ max x2 xLa ;xRa½ ;y2 yLa ;yRa½ 
 f x; yð Þ
8<
: (6)
From Eq. (6), the following a-cuts of functions of
positive fuzzy numbers can be easily derived:
~Z ¼ ~X þ ~Y ; ~Za : xLa þ yLa; xRa þ yRa
 
(7)
~Z ¼ ~X :~Y ; ~Za : xLa:yLa; xRa :yRa
 
(8)
~Z ¼ 1~X ; ~Za : 1xRa ; 1xLa
 
(9)
Evaluation of the fault tree top event using
fuzzy parameters
An overview of concepts and applications of the fuzzy
fault tree analysis was discussed in Mahmood, Ahmadi,
Figure 6 Illustration of one a-cut set of a fuzzy triangu-
lar number.
a C X 
Verma, Srividya, and Kumar (2013). Let ~Pi ði ¼ 1; 2:::nÞ
represent the fuzzy probability of event i, the a-cut set
of the output gate’s probability is given by:
~P
L
ANDa ¼
Yn
i¼1
~P
L
ia ;
~P
R
ANDa ¼
Yn
i¼1
~P
R
ia (10)
~P
L
ORa ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
1 ~PLia
 	
; ~P
R
ORa ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
1 ~PRia
 	
(11)
The following Lemma allows us to consider the
membership function’s shape of the probability of the
OR/AND-gate output.
Lemma 1. Let ~Xi be the fuzzy number whose xLia is
non-decreasing and xRia is non-increasing in a,
~Z be the
AND/OR-gate output of n fuzzy numbers ~Xi, then zLa is
non-decreasing and zRa is non-increasing in a.
Next, we evaluate the a-cut set of the gate output
when the unavailability of a basic component indir-
ectly evaluated through the corresponding fuzzy fail-
ure rate (~ki) and fuzzy repair rate (~ i).
Lemma 2.
1. Let ~Z be the unavailability of the component i,
then the a-cut set of ~Z is given by:
zLa ¼
kLia
Ria þ kLia
; zRa ¼
kRia
Lia þ kRia
(12)
2. Let ~Z be the output of the OR-gate, the a-cut set of
~Z is given by:
zLa ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
Ria
Ria þ kLia
; zRa ¼ 1
Yn
i¼1
Lia
Lia þ kRia
(13)
3. Let ~Z be the output of the AND-gate, the a-cut set
of ~Z is given by:
zLa ¼
Yn
i¼1
kLia
Ria þ kLia
; zRa ¼
Yn
i¼1
kRia
Lia þ kRia
(14)
4. Let ~Z be the output of the 2oo3-gate, then the
a-cut set of ~Z is given by:
zLa ¼
kLa

 3 þ 3 kLa
 2Ra
kLa þ Ra

 3
zRa ¼
kRa

 3 þ 3 kRa
 2La
kRa þ La

 3
8>>><
>>>:
(15)
Lemma 3. Considering a component having fuzzy fail-
ure rate ~k and fuzzy repair rate ~ where kLa; 
L
a are
non-decreasing in a and kRa ; 
R
a are non-increasing in a,
then its unavailability, ~Z is a fuzzy number whose zLa is
non-decreasing and zRa is non-increasing in a.
Theorem 1. Considering a series/parallel system that
includes components having fuzzy dependability param-
eters ~Xi where xLia is non-decreasing and x
R
ia is non-
increasing in a, the unavailability of this system is also
a fuzzy number ~Z whose zLia is non-decreasing and z
R
ia
is non-increasing in a.
It is also true for the 2003 system with identi-
cal components.
In summary, FT having fuzzy input parameters is
evaluated by Procedure 1. On other hand, from
Theorem 1, the membership function of the top event
probability, l~ZðzÞ, has the left side being monotone
non-decreasing in z and the right side being mono-
tone non-increasing in z. Based on these results, in
next section, the approach to evaluate the satisfaction
curve for unavailability of the autonomous LU will
be presented.
Procedure 1: Evaluating the FT with fuzzy param-
eter inputs
1: Set a¼ 0
2: while a  1 do
3: Determine a-cut set for all input fuzzy numbers.
4: Calculate the a-cut set for all gate outputs (by
Eqs. (15–19)) until the a-cut set of the top event
is obtained.
5: a ¼ aþ D, where D is a small amount
(e.g 10 4).
6: end while
7: Construct the membership function of the top
event by aggregation of all a-cut sets.
Evaluation of the satisfaction curve
of the unavailability of the autonomous
localization unit
Principles to obtain a satisfaction curve
The satisfaction curve of the autonomous LU’s
unavailability values will be identified for every
requirement of the advanced-ETCS unavailability.
Without loss of generality, we present in this section
the principles to determine the satisfaction curve
according to the requirement R1. Those principles
apply also for requirement R2.
The FT presented in Figure 2 can be evaluated by
minimal cuts represented in Figure 7. Let ULU and U1
characterizing respectively the autonomous LU’s fuzzy
unavailability and the fuzzy probability of the event
IU1 of the fault tree.
The membership function, l ~U1 ðU1Þ, is assessed by
Procedure 1 that describes the evaluation approach
for such FT with fuzzy parameter inputs. It is then
represented by the blue line in Figure 8. In order to
satisfy the requirement R1 (PTE1  UR1), the upper
threshold of ~U 1 is: UR1ULU . This threshold is char-
acterized by the red vertical line in Figure 8 when UR1
and ULU are precise numbers. Then, we consider the
satisfaction rate, which represents the satisfaction per-
centage (SP) of the advanced ETCS unavailability with
the ETCS requirement R1. It can be calculated by the
fraction of the gray area (SGA) over the surface SlðU1Þ
created by the membership function l~U 1ðU1Þ and the
horizontal ax, see Figure 8. If the red line is outside
(on the right) of the blue curve, that is,
URa¼0  ðUR1ULUÞ, the requirement R1 is statisfied
with all possible value of U1. Contrarily, the satisfac-
tion percentage (SP) is given by:
SP ¼ SGA
Sl U1ð Þ
(16)
In order to determine the exigence for the LU unavailabil-
ity (ULU) according to the ETCS requirement (R1), we
have to evaluate the SP values in function of ULU values:
 If ULU  UR1UR1a 0 ; SP ¼ 100%. If ULU>UR1UL1a 0 ; SP ¼ 0%. If UR1UR1a 0<ULU  UR1UL1a 0 , SP is identified by
Procedure 2. This procedure incluses two phrases.
Firstly, we evaluate the set of values of the satisfaction
percentage SP for all U1 values, where
U1 2 ½UL1a 0 ;UR1a 0 . Finally, corresponding to every
value of ULU we find the maximal value of SP (in the
set of SP values given by the first phase) such as this
value is inferior than UR1ULU . This procedure will
applied for the case study and its result will be pre-
sented in Figure 9.
Procedure 2: identifying the satisfaction curve
of the LU unavailability values
1: procedure Evaluate the satisfaction percentage, SP
Figure 7. Deduced view of the fault tree of the advanced ETCS due to hardware failures (RBC: Radio Block Center, LU: Localization
Unit, IE2: Unavailable signal from train to RBC due to Hardware failures, IE3: Unavailable signal from RBC to train due to Hardware
failures, IE4: Failed treatment of the received MA at train, TE1: Advanced ETCS unavailability due to Hardware failures).
Figure 8. Illustration of the satisfaction area.
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2: Let d be the length of the vector B including
obtained values of U1 that is evaluated by
Procedure 1. We have:
B ¼ fUL1a 0 ;UL1a i:D ;U1a 1 ;UR1a i:D ;UR1a 0g,
where ði ¼ 1; 2; :::; n1Þ.
3: for i¼ 2 : 1 : d do
4: Calculate SlðU1Þ, that is a vector having d ele-
ments, by the numerical integral following the trapezoidal
rule: SlðU1ÞðiÞ ¼ SlðU1Þði1Þ þ 0:5  ½BðiÞBði1Þ 
ðaBðiÞ þ aBði 1ÞÞ
5: end for
6: Evaluate vector SP: SP ¼ SlðU1ÞSlðU1ÞðdÞ
7: end procedure
8: procedure Identifying SPULU
9: Set i¼ 1
10: while ðd 6¼ iþ 1Þ do
11: h¼ roundððiþ dÞ=2Þ
12: if UR1ULU<BðhÞ then
13: d¼ h
14: end if
15: if UR1ULU>BðhÞ then
16: i¼ h
17: end if
18: if UR1ULU ¼ BðhÞ then
19: i¼ h; d¼ h
20: Break
21: end if
22: end while
23: SPULU ¼ SPðiÞþSPðdÞ2
24: end procedure
Case study: identifying the satisfaction curve
of the autonomous LU unavailability values
The input parameters for the case study are presented
in Table 1. For equipment of the RBC and the OBU, the
most probable failure rate values are chosen according
the values presented in Flammini (2006). The upper
and lower values of their failure rates are chosen
arbitrarily þ100% and –50% of the most probable val-
ues. On the other hand, as the Mean Time To ReStore
(MTTRS) of the OBU equipment and the RBC equip-
ment are respectively 1.737 and 0.896 hours (EEIG
ERTMS Users Group, 1998), the most probable values
of their repair rates are 0.58 and 1.12, respectively.
Furthermore, EEIG ERTMS Users Group (1998)
described that the standstill time of the OBU equipment
and the RBC equipment are respectively less than
4 hours and 2 hours. Then the lower bounds of repair
rates of all OBU and RBC equipment are respectively
0.25 and 0.5. In summary, the repair rates of the RBC
and OBU equipment are chosen as follows: ~OBUðeÞ :
½0:25; 0:58; 1:2 and ~RBCðeÞ : ½0:5; 1:12; 2:2 (/h).
Regarding the DCS, although the antenna is consid-
ered as a DCS equipment but is implemented on the
train, its repair rate is considered like the repair rate of
other onboard equipment. The most probable value of
the antenna failure rate is chosen according to the
MTBF of train antenna presented in the test report
(Comp, A., 2015. Certification of test report-MTBF-
OmPlecs-TOP 200 AMR.). For the eNodeB and eCNS,
the most likely values of their repair rates and failure
rates are chosen according to the values presented in
the commercial product descriptions (Huawei
Technology Company. LTE3.1 DBS3900 LTE Product
Description; Huawei eLTE3.3 eCNS210 product
description). The upper and lower values are chosen
arbitrarily þ100% and 50% of the corresponding
most probable value. Following Zimmermann and
Hommel (2005), the connection loss rate and reconnec-
tion rate are respectively ~kCL : ½10 4; 10 3; 10 2; ~CL :
½600; 1200; 2400 (/h).
The satisfaction percentages corresponding to
requirement R1 (noted SPR1) are then evaluated by
Procedure 2. It is represented by the blue dash line in
Figure 9. Similarly, corresponding to requirement R2,
the SPR2 are characterized by the red line. The final
satisfaction possibility SP is evaluated by:
Figure 9. Satisfaction curves of the LU unavailability values.
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SP ¼ minðSPR1; SPR2Þ. We find that if the LU unavail-
ability is inferior to 6.17E 5, the SP is 100%, while
the ETCS requirements cannot be satisfied when the
LU unavailability is superior to 1.42E 4.
When 6:17E5  ULU  1:42E4, the satisfaction
possibility follows the black dash line represented in
Figure 9.
To compare with the traditional methodology, we per-
form similar calculations using non-fuzzy algebra for eval-
uating the classical FT. The most probable values of the
input parameters are used to assess the probability U1.
The results describe that the LU unavailability must be
inferior or equal to 1.3E 4 to satisfy both requirements
R1 and R2. That means the ETCS requirement is also sat-
isfied when unavailability value of the autonomous LU is
1.3E 4. However, when using our methodology, taking
into account parametric uncertainties, the corresponding
satisfaction possibility of this value is only 28.53%. That
means we have to bear the high risk that the ETCS does
not meet the availability requirements. Contrarily, if we
consider the pessimist cases of input parameters, the trad-
itional approach result could lead to unnecessary expenses
for the development of the LU, and furthermore, could be
difficult to achieve in practice.
Discussion about the impact of components
and their parametric uncertainties on the
satisfaction curve
Let D be the set of the LU unavailability values whose
the SP corresponds to the ETCS requirements we want
to consider. The impact of component i on the LU satis-
faction curve is examined by the critical importance
measure (CIMi). It is evaluated by the difference
between the LU satisfaction curve when the component
i is working and when the component i is failing.
CIMi ¼
X
ULU2D
SPULU j i workingð ÞSPULU j i failingð Þ

 2s
(17)
Similarly, the impact of parameter uncertainty on
the LU satisfaction curve is examined by the uncer-
tainty importance measure (UIMj) of parameter j. It is
evaluated by the difference between the LU satisfac-
tion curve when the parameter j is precisely measured
and the one when the parameter j is fuzzy.
UIMj ¼
X
ULU2D
SPULU j j preciseð ÞSPULU j j fuzzyð Þ

 2s (18)
Table 2 presents the critical component ranking and
the parameter uncertainty impact ranking when
considering the satisfaction curve of the LU unavailabil-
ity values from 5E 5 to 1.8E 4. We find that the
components related to the data communication system
(DCS) such as the eNodeB, eCNS, air gap and the
antenna are respectively the most critical components
because their status directly affects on the advanced
ETCS unavailability. On the other hand, the impact of
the voter component can be negligible thanks to its
redundant configuration and its reliable characteristic.
Considering the ranking of the uncertainty importance
measure (UIM), we find that the impact of parametric
uncertainties of the DCS components on the satisfac-
tion curve is also the most important compared with
other parameters. Therefore, they must have more pre-
cise value than other parameters.
Discussion of the practical application and
benefits of the proposed methodology
In numerous recent articles (Milakis, van Arem, &
van Wee, 2017; Ran, Jin, Boyce, Qiu, & Cheng, 2012;
Shladover, 2017), the authors highlight perspectives of
future transportation research, in which the entire sys-
tem becomes more connected and automated. In fact,
the adoption of an autonomous LU in ETCS is encour-
aged by numerous European Commission research
projects. These projects aim to explore and promote the
use of satellites as a low-cost signaling solution and the
ERTMS Regional, in particular, is used in the highest
level of ETCS (level 3). An overview of these projects is
provided in Marais, Beugin, and Berbineau (2017) in
which the authors emphasized a promising perspective
of introducing the GNSS in railway mentalities, espe-
cially in the ETCS application. In fact, the potential
gains achievable by the combination of ETCS signaling
and train dispatching systems were highlighted in
Goverde, Corman, and D’Ariano (2013, 3). In Smith,
Majumdar, and Ochieng (2012), the authors
Table 1. Summary of the input parameters.
Parameter Lower Most Probable Upper
kPS 9.1E 6 1.82E 5 3.64E 5
kBUS 2.2E 6 4.4E 6 8.8E 6
kCPU 3.7E 6 7.4E 6 1.48E 5
kVoter 1.5E 6 3E 9 6E 9
kRTM 5E 7 1E 6 2E 6
kDMI 5E 8 1E 7 2E 7
kTIU 5E 8 1E 7 2E 7
kWAN 5E 8 1E 7 2E 7
keCNS 1.55E 6 3.1E 6 6.2E 6
keNodeB 3.25E 6 6.5E 6 1.3E 5
kAnten 3.05E 8 6.1E 8 1.22E 7
kCL 1E 4 1E 3 1E 2
 RBCðeÞ 0.5 1.12 2.2
OBUðeÞ & Anten 0.25 0.58 1.2
 eCNS &  eNodeB 0.5 1 2
 CL 600 1200 2400
investigated the technical and procedural challenges
relevant to the safe introduction of ERTMS into
European railway systems. The road map for the intro-
duction and exploitation of GNSS technologies in the
train control system based on the ERTMS architecture
was described in Senesi (2012). One of the principal
challenges is to verify that the performances obtained
correspond to the ETCS requirements including safety-
related ones. In particular, it is necessary to prove that
the new solution satisfies dependability and safety con-
ditions using especially RAMS requirements as defined
in the three European railway standards (i.e. EN50126,
EN50128, and EN50129). Traditional RAMS evaluation
approaches, including simulation and experimental
campaigns, are not adequate for wireless systems and
GNSS-based positioning systems in particular. In fact, it
is difficult to precisely obtain detailed information on
the system, component dependability parameters or
operation environments for simulations in the develop-
ment phase of a new system. On the other hands, for
on-sites-experimental campaigns, it requires a large
investment cost and, furthermore, it is quite impossible
to control all test conditions, for example possibility to
change the constellation and anticipation of future sys-
tems, such as the complete Galileo.
In this context, our new methodology could be
used to identify the specification of the LU according
to ETCS requirements. Thanks to the combination
between the hybrid apportionment procedure and the
fuzzy theory, it offers the ability to handle unknown
information about new sub-systems and the uncer-
tainties of its component dependability parameters. In
particular, it provides managers with satisfaction rate
information corresponding to the uncertainty interval
of the sub-system dependability when considering the
overall system requirement. Considering the case study,
the classical approach specifies that the LU maximal
unavailability should be 1.3E 4 to satisfy the ETCS
availability requirement. However, our new approach
shows that if this value is used when developing a new
LU, the satisfaction possibility according to the ETCS
requirement is quite small, only 28.53%. That means we
have to bear the high risk that the ETCS does not meet
the availability requirements. Contrarily, if we consider
the pessimistic cases of input parameters (i.e., the high-
est values of failure rates and lowest values of repair
rate), the traditional approach result describes a low
value of the LU unavailability. This requirement could
lead to unnecessary expenses in the development of the
LU, and furthermore, could be difficult to achieve in
practice. Using the new method, the obtained satisfac-
tion curve provides more information to analysts about
the satisfaction rate corresponding to every value of the
LU unavailability. This information reinforces the deci-
sion flexibility of managers. They could opt either for
an additional investment to improve the LU availability
or an acceptance of the low satisfaction rate to
reduce expenses.
On the other hand, thanks to the development of
the Galileo constellation, the localization could be
achieved by simultaneous multi-constellation manage-
ment algorithms. Therefore, it allows improving the
availability of the LU. For an extension of this work,
considering environmental effects when assessing the
ETCS availability requirement, the proposed method
could provide a satisfaction curve on the ETCS
requirement for the LU unavailability values due to
missing satellite signals. Based on that, the analyst
could consider the possibility of using the multi-con-
stellation to improve the LU availability and therefore
obtain a higher satisfaction rate. Moreover, this meth-
odology could also be applied in different practical sit-
uations to determine the requirements of a such new
subsystem according to overall system requirements.
For examples, to identify specifications of a new LTE
based data communication system, an overall ETCS
fuzzy FT could be constructed by investigating
internal system failures and external influences, which
are difficult to precisely evaluated. Therefore, manag-
ers can balance investment cost with desired
Table 2. Ranking of the components CIM and the input
parameters UIM.
Component CIM Ranking
eNodeB 1
eCNS 2
Airgap 3
Anten 4
PS 5
CPU 6
BUS 7
RTM 8
DMI 9
TIU 9
WAN 10
Voter 11
Parameter UIM Ranking
 eCNS &  eNodeB 1
keNodeB 2
kCL 3
 CL 4
keCNS 5
OBUðeÞ & Anten 6
kAnten 7
kPS 8
kCPU 9
 RBCðeÞ 10
kBUS 11
kRTM 12
kTIU & kDMI 13
kWAN 14
kVoter 15
performances thanks to the advantage of this
approach regarding uncertainties handling.
Conclusion
In this article, we have discussed the current trend of
the ETCS towards integrating onboard autonomous
localization. For the development process of this new
equipment, it is necessary to allocate required availability
values in order to meet ETCS requirements. Therefore,
we proposed a new approach for evaluating the satisfac-
tion rate of the LU unavailability to the defined ETCS
requirements. This method allows taking into account
parametric uncertainties to evaluate the fuzzy unavail-
ability of systems in series/parallels or K-out-of-N struc-
tures. The performance of our procedure has been
illustrated by a case study of an advanced ETCS inte-
grating LTE-based data communication system and an
onboard LU. The results showed that the upper thresh-
old of the LU unavailability obtained by the classical
method (using the most probable parameter values)
only corresponds to a satisfaction rate of 28.53% when
taking into account parametric uncertainty. The new
quantitative method provides more information to ana-
lysts about the satisfaction rate corresponding to every
value of the LU unavailability. It reinforces the flexibility
of manager decisions in practice: opt either for an add-
itional investment to improve the LU availability or an
acceptance of the low satisfaction rate to reduce
expenses. On the other hand, we highlighted the
importance of the DCS components when evaluating
the critical importance measures (CIM). We also high-
lighted their parametric uncertainties impact on the sat-
isfaction curve of the LU unavailability when
considering the uncertainty importance measure (UIM).
The methodology is generic in nature and can be
specifically tailored to determine the LU availability
requirements according to different ETCS availability
requirements. For examples, the internal system weak-
nesses and external influences could be taken into
account in an overall fuzzy FT. This is especially the
case for the environmental effects on the localization
(e.g. on GNSS signals) for which it is difficult to
obtain precise parameter values. In this case, managers
can benefit from the advantage of this approach han-
dling uncertainties, to balance ETCS life cycle cost
with desired performances. However, the evaluation
time of a large fuzzy FT could be an issue when con-
sidering a general case taking into account all types of
internal and external failures. Therefore, an efficient
algorithm to reduce the evaluation time should be
developed in the future.
In further works, using the new qualitative method
presented in this article, we could allocate the RAM
requirements to localization equipment. Furthermore,
according to the V-model, when a new system is com-
pleted, the operational test or virtual certification proc-
esses should be performed to prove its satisfaction rate.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by
the authors.
Funding
This work was performed in the framework of the
ELSAT 2020 project. This ELSAT 2020 project is co-
financed by the European Union with the European
Regional Development Fund, the French state and the
Hauts de France Region Council.
ORCID
Khanh T. P. Nguyen http://orcid.org/0000 0001
8184 8238
References
Arrizabalaga, S., Mendizabal, J., Pinte, S., Sanchez, J.,
Gonzalez, J., Themostokleous, M., & Lowe, D. (2014).
Development of an advanced testing system and smart
train positioning system for etcs applications. In
Transport research arena 2014, Paris.
Ai, B., Cheng, X., Kurner, T., Zhong, Z. D., Guan, K., He,
R. S., … Briso Rodriguez, C. (2014). Challenges toward
wireless communications for high speed railway. IEEE
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 15(5),
2143 2158. doi:10.1109/TITS.2014.2310771
EEIG ERTMS Users Group. (1998). ERTMS/ETCS RAMS
Requirements specification.
Filip, A., Bazant, L., Mocek, H., & Cach, J. (2000). GPS/
GNSS based train position locator for railway signalling.
In Computers in Railways VII.
Flammini, F. (2006). Model based dependability evaluation
of complex critical control systems (Doctor Thesis).
University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italia.
Goverde, R. M., Corman, F., & D’Ariano, A. (2013).
Railway line capacity consumption of different railway
signalling systems under scheduled and disturbed condi
tions. Journal of Rail Transport Planning & Management,
3, 78 94. doi:10.1016/j.jrtpm.2013.12.001
Kumar, K., & Kumar, P. (2011). Fuzzy availability modeling
and analysis of biscuit manufacturing plant: a case study.
International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and
Management, 2(3), 193 204. doi:10.1007/s13198 011 0076 3
Li, X., Zuo, M. J., & Yam, R. C. M. (2006). Reliability ana
lysis of a repairable k out of n system with some
G 
components being suspended when the system is down.
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 91(3), 305 310.
doi:10.1016/j.ress.2005.01.010
Liefferinge, M. V., & Paties, L. (2015). Preparing the com
munication system for ERTMS. European Railway
Review, 21(1).
Mahmood, Y. A., Ahmadi, A., Verma, A. K., Srividya, A., &
Kumar, U. (2013). Fuzzy fault tree analysis: A review of
concept and application. International Journal of System
Assurance Engineering and Management, 4(1), 19 32. doi:
10.1007/s13198 013 0145 x
Manz, H., Schnieder, E., Stein, D., Spinder, M., Lauer, M.,
Baudis, C., … Marais, J. (2015). GaLoROI. Satellite based
localization in railways. In International Congress on
Advanced Railway Engineering. Istanbul, Turquie.
Marais, J., Beugin, J., & Berbineau, M. (2017). A survey of
GNSS based research and developments for the European
railway signaling. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
Transportation Systems, 18(10), 2602 2618. doi:10.1109/
TITS.2017.2658179
Marradi, L., Galimberti, A., Foglia, L., Zin, A., Pecchioni, C.,
Doronzo, M., … Lekchiri, M. (2012). GNSS for Enhanced
Odometry: The GRAIL 2 results. Satellite Navigation
Technologies and European Workshop on GNSS Signals
and Signal Processing, (NAVITEC), 2012 6th ESA
Workshop (pp. 1 7). doi:10.1109/NAVITEC.2012.6423069
Milakis, D., van Arem, B., & van Wee, B. (2017). Policy and
society related implications of automated driving: A
review of literature and directions for future research.
Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems, 21(4),
324 348. doi:10.1080/15472450.2017.1291351
Min, Y., Chunhui, Y., & Sen, Z. (2013). Reliability model
for control center of railway signalling system based on
SRN. In Fourth International Conference on Digital
Manufacturing and Automation (ICDMA), 2013, (pp.
987 990). doi:10.1109/ICDMA.2013.231
Morant, A., Larsson Kråik, P. O., & Kumar, U. (2016).
Data driven model for maintenance decision support: A
case study of railway signalling systems. Proceedings of
the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of
Rail and Rapid Transit, 230(1), 220 234. doi:10.1177/
0954409714533680
Nguyen, K., Beugin, J., Berbineau, M., & Kassab, M. (2014).
Modelling Communication Based Train control system
for dependability analysis of the LTE Communication
network in train control application. In European
Modelling Symposium. Pise, ITALIE.
Nguyen, K., Beugin, J., Berbineau, M., & Kassab, M. (2015).
Analytical approach for evaluating LTE communication
errors in train control application. In 1st IEEE ICC 2015
Workshop on Dependable Vehicular Communications.
Londres, ROYAUME UNI.
Nguyen, K., Beugin, J., & Marais, J. (2013). Dependability
evaluation of a GNSS and ECS based localisation unit for
railway vehicles. In 13th International Conference on ITS
Telecommunications.
Nguyen, T. P. K., Beugin, J., & Marais, J. (2015). Method for
evaluating an extended Fault Tree to analyse the depend
ability of complex systems: Application to a satellite based
railway system. Reliability Engineering & System Safety,
133, 300 313. doi:10.1016/j.ress.2014.09.019
Qiu, S., Sallak, M., Sch€on, W., & Cherfi Boulanger, Z.
(2014). Availability assessment of railway signalling sys
tems with uncertainty analysis using Statecharts.
Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory, 47, 1 18. doi:
10.1016/j.simpat.2014.04.004
Qiu, S., Sallak, M., Sch€on, W., & Cherfi Boulanger, Z.
(2013). Epistemic parametric uncertainties in availability
assessment of a Railway Signalling System using Monte
Carlo simulation. In European Safety and Reliability
Conference, ESREL 2013. Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Ramdas, V. & Bradbury, T. (2010). ERTMS L3 Risks and
Benefits to UK railways (Client final report No. CPR798
PPCA09094). Transportation Research laboratory.
Ran, B., Jin, P. J., Boyce, D., Qiu, T. Z., & Cheng, Y. (2012).
Perspectives on future transportation research: Impact of
intelligent transportation system technologies on next
generation transportation modeling. Journal of Intelligent
Transportation Systems, 16(4), 226 242. doi:10.1080/
15472450.2012.710158
Rausand, M., & Hoyland, A. (2004). System reliability the
ory: Models, statistical methods, and applications. Wiley
Series in Probability and Statistics Applied Probability
and Statistics Section. Hoboken: Wiley.
Roongpiboonsopit, D., & Karimi, H. A. (2009). A multi
constellations satellite selection algorithm for integrated
global navigation satellite systems. Journal of Intelligent
Transportation Systems, 13(3), 127 141. doi:10.1080/
15472450903084238
Senesi, F. (2012). Satellite application for train control sys
tems: The Test Site in Sardinia. Journal of Rail Transport
Planning & Management, 2(4), 73 78. doi:10.1016/
j.jrtpm.2013.08.001
Shladover, S. E. (2017). Connected and automated vehicle
systems: Introduction and overview. Journal of Intelligent
Transportation Systems, 22, 190 200.
Smith, P., Majumdar, A., & Ochieng, W. Y. (2012). An over
view of lessons learnt from ERTMS implementation in
European railways. Journal of Rail Transport Planning &
Management, 2(4), 79 87. doi:10.1016/j.jrtpm.2013.10.004
Sniady, A. (2015). Communication Technologies Support to
Railway Infrastructure and Operations (Doctor Thesis).
Technical University of Denmark, Denmark.
Sniady, A., Soler, J., & Berbineau, M. &. (2013).
Performance of LTE in high speed railway scenarios. In
Communication Technologies for Vehicles (pp. 211 222).
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin: Springer.
Vernez, D., & Vuille, F. (2009). Method to assess and opti
mise dependability of complex macro systems:
Application to a railway signalling system. Safety Science,
47(3), 382 394. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2008.05.007
Yasuoka, K., Watabe, A., Hattori, T., & Matsumoto, M.
(2011). The policy of applying RAMS to evaluate railway
signalling systems for reliable transportation. In E.
Schnieder & G. Tarnai (Eds.), FORMS/FORMAT 2010
(pp. 55 63). Berlin: Springer.
Zimmermann, A., & Hommel, G. (2005). Towards modeling
and evaluation of ETCS real time communication and
operation. Journal of Systems and Software., 77(1), 47 54.
doi:10.1016/j.jss.2003.12.039 doi:10.1016/j.jss.2003.12.039
Zimmermann, H. J. (2010). Fuzzy set theory. Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics, 2(3),
317 332. doi:10.1002/wics.82
Appendix A
Proofs of lemmas and theorems
Lemma 1. Considering a1<a2, we have: xLia1  x
L
ia2
and
xRia1  x
R
ia2
, then:
1.
Qn
i 1 x
L
ia1
Qni 1 xLia2 and Qni 1 xRia1 Qni 1 xRia2 .
2. As the AND gate output probability calculated by
Eq.(10), Lemma 1 is obtained.
3.
Qn
i 1ð1 xLia1 Þ 
Qn
i 1ð1 xLia2 Þ andQn
i 1ð1 xRia1 Þ 
Qn
i 1ð1 xRia2 Þ.
)
1
Yn
i 1
1 xLia1
 	
 1
Yn
i 1
1 xLia2
 	
1
Yn
i 1
1 xRia1
 	
 1
Yn
i 1
1 xRia2
 	
8>><
>>:
As the OR gate output probability calculated by Eq. (11),
Lemma 1 is obtained.
Lemma 2. 1. From Eq. (1), the partial derivatives of za
with respect to kia and ia can be obtained:
@za
@ia
¼  kia
ia þ kiað Þ2
;
@za
@kia
¼ ia
ia þ kiað Þ2
As i, ki > 0, then
@za
@ia
<0 and @za@kia >0. Therefore, from
Eq. (6), we derive Eq. (12).
2. The partial derivatives of za (from Eq. 2) with respect
to kja ; ja , we obtain:
@za
@ja
¼  kja
ja þ kja

 2 Y
i 1;i6 j
ia
ia þ kia
@za
@kja
¼ ja
ja þ kja

 2 Y
i 1;i6 j
ia
ia þ kia
As failure and repair rates are positives, then @za@ja <0 and@za
@kja
>0. Therefore, from Eq. (6), we derive Eq. (13).
3. Similar to the OR gate case, we easily derive @za@ja <0
and @za@kja >0 after evaluating the partial derivative of za with
respect to kja ; ja . Therefore, from Eq. (6), we derive Eq. (14).
4. Similarly, from Eq. (5), we get the partial of derivatives of
za with respect to ka and a, we then easily deduce
@za
@ja
<0 and
@za
@kja
>0. Therefore, from Eq. (6), we derive Eq. (15).
Lemma 3. Considering a1<a2, we have:
kLa1
kLa2
 1
Ra1
Ra2
 1
) k
L
a1
kLa2
 
R
a1
Ra2
) kLa1Ra2  kLa2Ra1
8>><
>>:
) k
L
a1
R
a2kLa2Ra1
Ra1 þ kLa1
 	
La2 þ kRa2
 	  0 ) kLa1
Ra1 þ kLa1
 k
L
a2
Ra2 þ kLa2
Hence, from Eq. (12) we have: zLa1  zLa2
Similarly, we can deduce zRa1  zRa2 .
Theorem 1. Firstly, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, if fuzzy
dependability parameters (such as unavailability probabilities,
failure/repair rates) of components, noted ~Xi, have non decreas
ing xLia and non increasing x
R
ia in a, then, the AND/OR gate’s
output is also a fuzzy number, ~Z where zLia is non decreasing
and zRia is non increasing in a. In other words, the unavailability
of the series/parallel system is also a fuzzy number ~Z whose zLia is
non decreasing and zRia is non increasing in a.
Secondly, we prove that it is also true for 2oo3 structure.
In fact, from Eq. (15), we have:
zLa1zLa2 ¼ kLa1Ra2kLa2Ra1
h i
 
3 kLa1
R
a2 þ kLa2Ra1
 	
kLa1k
L
a2 þ Ra1Ra2
 	
þ 8kLa1kLa2Ra1Ra2
þ kLa1Ra2 þ kLa2Ra1
 	2
2
6664
3
7775
Ra1 þ kLa1
 	3
Ra2 þ kLa2
 	3
As we have: >0; k>0 and kLa1
R
a2  kLa2Ra1 ,
then zLa1zLa2  0
Similarly, we can deduce zRa1  zRa2 as >0; k>0
and kRa1
L
a2  kLa1Ra2
Appendix B
List of Abbreviations
CPU Computer Processor Unit,
DCS Data Communication System,
DMI Driver Machine Interface,
eCNS eLTE Core Network Access System,
ERTMS European Management System,
ETCS European Train Control System,
EuroRTM EuroRadio Transmission Module,
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System,
GSM R Global System for Mobile
Communications Railway,
LU Hard Localization Unit Hardware,
LTE Long Term Evolution,
MA Movement Authority,
IE1 Unavailable message from train due to
Hardware failures,
IE2 Unavailable signal from train to RBC due to
Hardware failures,
IE3 Unavailable signal from RBC to train due to
Hardware failures,
IE4 Failed treatment of the received MA at train,
OBU Onboard Equipment Unit,
PS Power System,
RBC Radio Block Center,
TE1 Advanced ETCS unavailability due to
Hardware failures,
TE2 Advanced ETCS unavailability due to hardware
failures and communication errors,
TIU Train Interface Unit,
TMR Triple Modular Redundancy,
UIM Uncertainty Importance Measure,
WAN Wide Area Network
